Structure of the Cuban Occupation Army in Venezuela
This summary describes the organizational structure of the Cuban military presence in Venezuela.
This summary describes the organizational structure of the Cuban military presence in Venezuela. Although the information does not come from an official source, it provides a detailed account of personnel, equipment, and operational strategies. The original source has been erased from the internet. However, it was reproduced in this other blog and saved in internet archive. We also provide summaries of other 2 important sources in this subject.
Structure of the Cuban Occupation Army in Venezuela
Personnel
Officers:
2 Brigadier Generals (stationed in Fuerte Tiuna and Barquisimeto)
4 Colonels
8 Lieutenant Colonels
6 Frigate Captains
25 Junior Officers
Infantry:
4,500 soldiers organized into 8 battalions of 500 personnel each, plus one battalion stationed at Fuerte Tiuna.
Command and Coordination
An independent operational room is set up in Fuerte Tiuna (Servicio de Remonta), connected via encrypted WF communication to the Operations Command Center in Valle Picadura, Havana. This network operates under the command of Major General Leonardo Adolfo Valdez, based in Havana.
Troops are rotated between Venezuela and Cuba via a runway in Apure and Ramp 2 at Maracaibo’s airbase.
Cuban contingents arrived in Venezuela starting January 2012, replacing previous units deployed since 2011.
Key Command Figures
General Command
General Leonardo Adolfo Valdez (60 years):
Formerly stationed in Angola as a lieutenant and deputy chief of the FARC staff in Cuba.
Coordinator of the "Bolivarian Movement" and Vice Director of the Cuban Communist Party.
Oversees "Operation Bastion," a contingency plan for Cuban battalions in Venezuela in case of political changes.
Operational Command
Brigadier General Herminio Hernández Rodríguez:
Political Commissioner and advisor to the Situation Room in Miraflores.
Specializes in urban operations and crisis management.
Manages operations to address civil unrest across 11 cities in Venezuela, including the use of militias.
Intelligence Command
Brigadier General Alejandro Ronda Marrero:
Reports directly to Major General Hugo Carvajal, head of Venezuela's national intelligence service.
Oversees military and civilian intelligence, including operations targeting opposition leaders, political campaigns, and high-ranking military officers.
Collaborates with Cuban, Iranian, and Chinese officers.
Operational Presence and Logistics
Officers stationed in Venezuela report directly to Major General Julio Cesar Gandarilla, head of Cuban counterintelligence.
Mobile agents operate in 12 strategic locations across Caracas, particularly in Metro stations and critical residential areas, coordinating with 70 command posts under the "Guaraira Repano Plan."
Arms and Equipment
Cuban forces in Venezuela are equipped with:
AK-A-103 and AK-109 assault rifles.
Tropv R1V rocket launchers (50 mm).
Kalisnef-120 anti-tank howitzers.
Katyusha M30 mortars.
Geostrategic Deployment
Cuban troops are stationed in key locations to intercept Venezuelan army units heading toward Caracas:
Agua Viva
Barinas
Morón-Coro
Barquisimeto
Elorza
Puerto Cabello
El Tigre-Pariaguán
La Encrucijada-Maracay
Iranian Involvement
An Iranian base in Zuata, Anzoátegui, is reportedly operated by Iranian aeronautical engineers. The base houses operational missiles with ranges between 1,480 km (Sheralabs 3) and 2,800 km (Alghadv-110). Additional missile installations are under construction in Paraguaná.
This document portrays a highly organized and militarized Cuban presence in Venezuela, emphasizing coordination with Iranian forces and control over key strategic areas to safeguard Cuban-Venezuelan interests.
Cuba's Influence on the National Armed Force
The military relationship with Cuba deepened starting in 2005, when groups of officers and cadets from Venezuela’s military training schools began making courtesy visits to the island, accompanied by visits from Venezuelan Navy ships. This relationship further strengthened as Venezuelan military personnel were sent to study at institutions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba.
Simultaneously, Cuban military personnel established a presence in Venezuela, undertaking various roles in military instruction, organization, and technology. They also acted as advisors and intermediaries in the acquisition of weapons systems for the National Armed Force.
In April 2010, Brigadier General Antonio Rivero González publicly stated that the primary reason for his retirement from the military was the “presence and interference of Cuban military personnel” within the institution. This interference extended to the planning and organization of the National Armed Force, including the design of the Strategic Regions of Integral Defense and the delivery of military doctrinal instruction at command and General Staff levels.
Following General Rivero’s statement, President Hugo Chávez publicly acknowledged, for the first time, the presence of Cubans within the National Armed Force, although he downplayed its significance. “What Cubanization? The Cubans are helping us. They’ve shown us how to store compasses, repair tank radios, and properly store ammunition.”
Since then, military relations between Cuba and Venezuela have intensified. In the naval sector, Cubans have been contracted to "modernize" Venezuelan shipyards, and Cuban shipyards have been used to construct and repair Venezuelan Navy vessels. This paradoxical arrangement occurred despite Cuba not being considered a naval power or having a significant maritime tradition.
The Occupying Military Force Operating in Venezuela
By Francisco Olivares, Summary and Analysis by our team.
In January 2024, General Joaquín Quintas Solá, Vice Minister of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, made an official visit to Venezuela to oversee joint defense exercises. Accompanied by Cuban specialists in territorial defense, he supervised military operations on the island of La Orchila during Venezuela's "Zamora 200" drills. While such events are not unusual, they underscore the deepening ties between Venezuela and Cuba that began with a bilateral agreement in 2000. That agreement brought 7,200 Cubans to Venezuela at an estimated cost of $1 billion, according to reports from El Universal.
A Growing Cuban Presence
From 2004 onward, Cuba's involvement in Venezuela expanded. By 2007, over 20,000 Cubans were working in Venezuela, primarily in healthcare, though many eventually defected. The collaboration extended into military restructuring, with Cuban advisors helping shape Venezuela’s military doctrine and organization.
Cuban Influence on Venezuela’s Military Structure
Starting in 2007, radical changes within Venezuela’s National Armed Forces (FANB) aligned the military with Cuba’s strategic model. This included the creation of Integral Defense Regions (REDI) and the adoption of the slogan “Homeland, Socialism, or Death.” Cuban advisors played a significant role in these transformations, integrating a doctrine of “total war” and establishing operational zones for defense.
Cuban advisors also organized a military unit based in Fuerte Tiuna, Venezuela’s largest military installation, to oversee defense operations. This effort helped centralize control over civil society and regional authorities, reinforcing the regime’s internal security apparatus.
Economic and Military Parallels with Cuba
Venezuela’s current economic crisis mirrors Cuba’s struggles following the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. Just as Cuba faced a sharp contraction in GDP, hyperinflation, and a devaluation of its currency, Venezuela is enduring similar challenges. The Cuban government’s response involved downsizing its military and redirecting resources to economic production. Senior Cuban military officials gained control over the country’s most lucrative industries, a model now mirrored in Venezuela.
The Venezuelan military wields considerable power over the economy, controlling key industries such as mining, oil, and food distribution. High-ranking military officers have assumed leadership roles in state-run enterprises, reflecting a Cuban-inspired approach to consolidating political and economic control.
A Military-Dominated Economy
By 2017, Venezuela’s armed forces managed 20 state-run industries, ranging from steel production to food importation. Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López emphasized the importance of these military enterprises in stabilizing the national economy. Despite this economic influence, Venezuela’s military leadership remains loyal to the regime, reinforcing its grip on power.
This analysis is based on a detailed article originally published by Francisco Olivares in Diario de las Americas on October 27, 2017. For the full original text, refer to our sources.
The relationship between Cuba and Venezuela has evolved into a complex web of military, economic, and political influence, with significant consequences for Venezuela's sovereignty and internal dynamics. What began as a bilateral partnership in 2000 has transformed Venezuela into a state where Cuban military strategies and doctrines heavily influence its armed forces. This collaboration extends beyond military integration, encompassing economic control and internal security, ensuring the regime’s stability amidst a profound economic crisis.
Key parallels between Venezuela and Cuba demonstrate a shared strategy for maintaining authoritarian control:
Military Restructuring for Regime Stability: Both nations reshaped their militaries to prioritize loyalty over functionality, creating overlapping defense regions and assigning economic control to high-ranking officers. These changes consolidate power within the military, marginalizing civilian authority and regional governance.
Economic Militarization: In both Cuba and Venezuela, the military’s role extends far beyond defense, dominating critical industries and serving as a cornerstone for regime survival. This militarized economy reinforces the regime’s power by providing wealth and privileges to military elites.
Socioeconomic Crisis Management: The militarization of state functions and resources reflects an effort to counteract the destabilizing effects of economic collapse, inflation, and widespread shortages. In both cases, this strategy prioritizes regime survival over addressing the broader population’s needs.
While these strategies provide short-term stability, they erode democratic institutions and civil governance, exacerbating social inequalities and economic mismanagement. The Venezuelan model, heavily inspired by Cuba’s experience, demonstrates how military entrenchment in civilian spheres consolidates power but perpetuates systemic inefficiencies and public discontent.
Ultimately, the heavy reliance on military control in both countries underscores the fragility of authoritarian regimes that prioritize power preservation over sustainable governance. While this approach has prolonged the regimes’ lifespans, it has also entrenched crises that threaten long-term stability and development.
Sources: 1-Estructura-FANB-definitivo-CASO-1V. Maibort Petit’s Blog. Diario de Las Americas
You can find our original article in Spanish in foresightcuba.com