The Special Period in Cuba
Demographic and Economic Indicators of the Disaster
In 1991, the Cuban state inaugurated the Special Period in Times of Peace. The term "Special Period" is a euphemism used by the Cuban Armed Forces to refer to a "war." This "period" has not yet ended, and the Cuban state has not made any public document or announcement with plans to terminate it. Cubans remember the 1990s as the decade when living conditions deteriorated drastically. The scarcity of material goods and the irregular supply of electricity led to protests on Havana's Malecón on August 5, 1994 (See Maleconazo). Famine reached levels comparable to those in North Korea. The government even prepared documents instructing how to survive with zero food and zero fuel.
There is a perception among the population that the current crisis is worse than that of the early 1990s. In this article, we compare some indicators between the two periods. We contrast the worst years, from 1991 to 1995, with the 2019–2023 period for demographic data, and from 1995 to 1999 with the 2018–2022 period for economic data. Economic statistics are incomplete for both the early 1990s and 2023, as reported by the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI).
Demographic Indicators:
If we compare the population of 1995 with that of 2023, we see an 8% decrease. We are now 10 million inhabitants, a figure the UN had predicted, in its most pessimistic scenario, for the year 2042. The number of people aged 60 or older has increased by 30%. The number of women aged 15 to 35 has decreased by 36%, while the number of girls aged 0 to 14 has dropped by 27%. The number of births in 2023 was similar to that of 1905, with 90,000. The government estimates that in 2024 this figure will reach 70,000, a number the UN projected, in its most pessimistic scenario, for the year 2036.
If we add a 64% increase in deaths and an almost 1000% rise in migration, we can conclude that the process of population decline (extinction of the nation) in Cuban territory, which we warned about in our 2016 article, has accelerated dramatically.
Economic Indicators:
Regarding macroeconomic indicators, there has been a significant increase in Gross Domestic Product, the state budget, service exports, electricity consumption, and imports—particularly from the United States, from which over one billion dollars' worth of goods were imported during the 2018–2022 period.
Domestically, the production of sugar, cement, and renewable energy has decreased significantly. Despite the notable rise in imports, energy consumption in the industrial sector declined by 6%, highlighting the deterioration of industrial production and, consequently, the export of goods. This decline has also impacted food production, which dropped by 16% compared to the total output in each of the five-year periods analyzed.
Moreover, the trend is negative: while approximately 10 million tons of food were produced in 2004, only 3.4 million tons were achieved in 2022.
In addition, there has been a reduction in the number of cattle, which decreased from 4.4 million to 3.7 million in 2022. The results of the livestock census initiated in March 2024 have not been released.
On the other hand, investments are concentrated in the tourism sector, with little investment in agriculture and manufacturing, which contradicts the call to eliminate the import mentality. The number of arrivals in the country increased by 164%, while revenues grew by only 8%.
Furthermore, there is a drastic increase in GDP, which rose from 24 billion pesos in 1995 to 869 billion pesos in 2023. On the other hand, there is a sharp decrease in the purchasing power of the population, a brutal increase in the electricity generation deficit that sometimes affects more than 50% of the population, interruptions in the supply of goods for the basic food basket, the absence of most medications, interruptions in gas and electricity supply, a halt in the waste collection system, an increase in diseases like dengue, and interruptions in the drinking water supply.
All of this is happening on an unprecedented scale while there is a rise in repression, which has led not only to the imprisonment of many young people but also to persecutions for publishing information that exposes the reality of the country.
We can summarize that since 2018:
More than one million people have emigrated, with serious consequences not only for the availability of the labor force but also for the drastic reduction of the population and its replacement possibilities.
The National Bank of Cuba has issued more than 225 billion pesos without productive backing between 2019 and 2023, causing severe inflation and a reduction in the population's purchasing power.
National food production has virtually come to a halt, relying on donations from other governments, but only if the donation is made through Cuban government institutions.
Instead of eliminating the dual currency system, the National Bank of Cuba has replaced the CUC with the MLC, a digital currency that cannot be legally purchased with Cuban pesos. By 2025, the possibility of selling in dollars will be introduced, but only for authorized companies, with no transparency in the authorization process.
The state has suspended the necessary funding for the construction and capital maintenance of thermoelectric plants, which has led to frequent disconnections in the electrical grid, along with a generation deficit that typically exceeds the disconnection of one-third of residential consumption. The gas supply for cooking has also been interrupted.
The distribution of medicines has virtually stopped, with 70% of essential medicines either out of stock or with low availability.
The National Bank of Cuba has begun a process of withdrawing cash without creating the conditions for smooth and efficient e-commerce, turning cash withdrawals from banks into a nightmare.
The creation of small and medium-sized enterprises has been promoted, with the contribution of 47 million euros donated by the European Union between 2021 and 2022. This money in the EU is directly transferred to the companies, but it is unknown how this money has been used in Cuba. The government has not allowed the establishment of a legal market for the buying and selling of foreign currency.
The government has focused on maintaining an obsolete and inefficient political power structure, regardless of its consequences, including the destruction of all infrastructure (except for some luxury enclaves) and the accelerated and intentional reduction of Cuba's population.
References
Central Bank of Cuba (BCC). (n.d.). Reports on inflation and monetary issuance.
Barros Díaz, O. (2000). Demographic scenarios of the Cuban population 2000-2050. Havana: Center for Demographic Studies (CEDEM), University of Havana.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). (n.d.). Migration statistics and their impact on population.
European Union – International Partnerships. (2021). Cuba Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021–2027. Available at: https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-01/mip-2021-c2021-9130-cuba-annex_en.pdf.
National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI). (n.d.). Reports on foreign trade, tourism, and agricultural production (missing data for 2023).
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (n.d.). Data on agricultural production and food security in Cuba.
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). (n.d.). Public health and disease statistics in Cuba.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2022). World Population Prospects 2022. Available at: https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads.
Amnesty International & Human Rights Watch. (n.d.). Documentation on human rights violations and repression in Cuba.
Original article in Spanish: Foresight Cuba